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This chapter discusses the current issues of the French
economy. It is obviously beyond the scope of this
report to discuss all aspects. Our approach is therefore
focussed on a central question: What is the current
government trying to achieve economically and will it
succeed?
In order to address this question, we first provide
some macroeconomic background and discuss it in
connection with the main economic policy debates
that have dominated French circles in the last two
decades. We then describe and analyse the main
reforms implemented by the Sarkozy administration.
Our overall assessment is mixed. On the one hand, the
administration has managed to get through many
reforms that had failed or were not even attempted
during previous conservative governments. In particu-
lar, there is an ongoing, potentially important reform
of the public sector. On the other hand, the govern-
ment is well in the tradition of engineering small
adjustments within a well-established framework,
rather than changing that framework. Thus reforms
are remarkable much more by their number than by
their depth, and we cast doubt on their economic effi-
ciency especially in light of some existing contradic-
tions. 
Finally we suggest that it is time
for the government to abandon
this catch-all approach and use
its political capital to implement
a few major, vital reforms. We
suggest that more care be given
to the reform of government.
This reform is underway and
promising but it would be im-
proved were it not for the obsta-
cle of a constant flow of new pol-
icy measures that interfere with
it. Our other suggestion is a
reduction of the minimum wage,
which however has never been considered except in
19941 and remains a major taboo. Yet with more than
15 percent of workers at the minimum wage, this is
becoming a huge burden that calls for action. As we
discuss below, an opportunity to reduce the minimum
wage was lost when the Revenu de Solidarité Active
(RSA) was introduced. 
2. Macroeconomic developments
This section provides some macroeconomic back-
ground for the recent evolution of the French econo-
my and discusses it in light of the ongoing policy
debates that in turn have shaped the reforms we dis-
cuss in Section 3. We start by analysing the French
economy’s growth and competitiveness, then discuss
developments on the employment front and finally
discuss the evolution of the public finances.
2.1 Growth and Competitiveness
Table 4.1 shows the growth rates of the French econ-
omy since 1992, with a comparison to France’s main
neighbours and the euro area. Over a long period,
France’s performance is very similar to that of the
euro area as a whole. It has avoided the stagnation of
Italy and Germany (the latter having been reversed in
2006), while remaining substantially below the best
Table 4.1  
The annual growth rate of the French economy in PPP terms
Time period France Germany Italy UK Spain Euro
area
1992–96 1.2 1.4 1.1 2.5 1.5 1.4
1997–2001 3.0 2.1 2.1 3.1 4.4 2.8
2002 1.1 0.0 0.3 2.1 2.7 0.9
2003 1.1 – 0.2 0.1 2.8 3.1 0.8
2004 2.2 0.6 1.4 3.3 3.3 1.8
2005 1.9 1.0 0.7 1.8 3.6 1.7
2006 2.4 3.1 1.9 2.9 3.9 2.9
2007 2.1 2.6 1.4 3.0 3.8 2.6
2002–2007 1.8 1.2 1.0 2.6 3.4 1.8
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 84 (2008). 
1 The Balladur government tried at the time to introduce a sub-min-
imum wage for younger workers which was met with very violent
protests and eventually withdrawn. performers (Ireland, Spain, or,
outside the euro area, the UK).
The 1980s and the 1990s were
characterized by a slow econom-
ic decline in relative terms: the
growth performance of France
was below that of most other
advanced economies. While most
of the decline could be explained
by the fall in employment and
hours worked per employee, the
country was also lagging in some
technological indicators like
information technology penetra-
tion (see Saint-Paul 2003). This
pattern was overcome in the late
1990s when France’s growth rate
caught up with the European average. Thus France’s
growth performance can be summarised as “average
European”, which means rather modest. 
However, one can see that France’s performance in
the last two or three years – boom years in the euro
area – was again below average. It may be due to
France being less cyclical than the rest of the zone –
doing better in slumps and worse in booms. This is
consistent with the view that its labour market is
comparatively more rigid, so that employment
adjusts less, both upwards and downwards. Or it may
be that its relative decline had fortuitously stopped
and has recently resumed, since the underlying struc-
tural weaknesses have not been addressed. Clearly,
there are too few observations to support (or reject)
such a statement. A third hypothesis is that it is slow-
ing down in relative terms because it is losing com-
petitiveness and therefore exporting less. This is espe-
cially plausible in light of the spectacular recovery of
the German economy in 2006–2007, which was part-
ly due to its internal devaluation. Clearly, any reduc-
tion in the price of German exports harms French
exporters.
Traditionally, policy in France has always been some-
what mercantilist, keeping a watchful eye on the
trade balance. While one should not ascribe too
much importance to this statistic in the short run, we
also know that protracted overvaluations of the real
exchange rate can lead to significant competitiveness
problems, permanent loss of the industrial base,2
mounting external deficits and in the end an excess
downward correction of the real exchange rate asso-
ciated with a brutal fall in living standards (this is
arguably the current US scenario). In the context of
the European Monetary Union such a correction
cannot take place through a depreciation of the nom-
inal exchange rate, which means that a real overvalu-
ation can be even more long-lived than if the
exchange rate were flexible and consequently that the
subsequent correction must be brought about by
downward pressure on prices which can only be
achieved if output is below potential.3 Furthermore,
the longer the overvaluation period, the larger the
correction in the real exchange rate needed to restore
the external balance in the long run, which makes
overvaluation even more problematic under fixed
exchange rates arrangements. There are reasons to
believe that a number of euro area countries, most
notably Greece, Portugal and Spain, are in such
painful overvaluation situations.4
In the 1980s and early 1990s, French macroeconomic
policy was chiefly driven by the so-called désinflation
competitive, which aimed at reducing the trade deficit
while maintaining a fixed parity vis-à-vis the Deutsch
Mark. This policy was eventually successful in elimi-
nating trade deficits but came at the cost of high
unemployment over a number of years. Since then,
France eventually accumulated surpluses but, as
Figure 4.1 shows, its trade balance has slowly deterio-
rated since it entered the EMU. The most recent data
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2 See, for example, Baldwin and Krugman (1989).
Figure 4.1
3 These issues are discussed in our 2002 EEAG report, Ch. 4.
4 According to the OECD data that we use, the trade deficit in
Greece, Portugal and Spain in 2007 was 13, 7.5 and 7 percent of
GDP, respectively. In terms of relative prices Italy is also overvalued
but the consequences for trade deficits seem milder than in these
three countries.EEAG Report 2009 143
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confirm this development and suggest a trade deficit
in 2008 of around 3 percent of GDP.
Of course, this trend is in large part due to the euro’s
appreciation. However, it is compounded by the fact
that while France’s inflation rate is comparable to that
of the euro area, it is higher than in Germany, as can
be seen in Figure 4.2. And Germany is probably more
of a competitor to France than the euro area coun-
tries that have high inflation rates such as Spain or
Ireland.5
That being said, price developments are not the sole
explanation for the recent adverse evolution of
France’s external accounts. A report by Fontagné et
Gaulier (2008) highlights the fact that France, unlike
Germany, has not been able to use outsourcing to
concentrate on the skill-intensive segments of the
value chain (see Sinn’s “Bazaar Economy”; 2005). As
a result, France has suffered a huge loss of market
shares in exports in favour of Germany. According to
Fontagné and Gaulier, France’s market share in total
world exports in 2007 is only 70 percent of its 1995
level, while Germany has almost maintained its mar-
ket share over that period.6
If France’s export performance is structurally weaker
than Germany’s, that suggests its real exchange rate
should be depreciated, which in the context of the
euro can only take place through lower inflation than
in Germany. But as Figure 4.2 shows, the trend is in
the opposite direction, suggesting a painful adjust-
ment lies ahead, with a risk of returning to the painful
years of désinflation compétitive and the associated
high unemployment rates.
2.2 Trends in employment
A. Working time
The popular vision of the French economy is that
there are many unemployed people and that the
employed work very few hours. We argue that this is
changing. Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of the
annual number of hours worked per employee since
1990. We can see that in France, as in other
European countries, there is a downward trend.
Furthermore, among major European countries
France clearly is in the bottom league, topping
Germany only. In particular, one can see a sharp
drop in hours between 1998 and 2002, when the
35 hour week was implemented by the Jospin gov-
ernment. Interestingly, though, hours per employee
then reached a trough and have increased slightly,
contrary to other countries where the downward
trend has continued. This is a sign that France is per-
haps leaving the “bottom league”, and this may be
reinforced by recent reforms described below that
promote the use of overtime. 
While the normal workweek has been shortened, the
proportion of workers who do not work a “normal”
workweek has been going up in recent years, and
hours have gone up among these workers. Hence,
according to OECD data, the proportion of workers
working between 35 and 39 hours a week has fallen
by two percentage points, from 49.8 percent to
47.5 percent between 2003 and 2007. Meanwhile, the
proportion of workers working more than 40 hours
a week has increased from 31.0 to 33.1 percent. So,
despite the legal workweek of 35 hours, a large frac-
tion of the workforce works
more than 40 hours, and that
fraction is increasing.  Figure 4.2
5 Furthermore, comparing French infla-
tion to euro area inflation is somewhat
misleading as the euro area includes poor-
er countries which can have more inflation
because of non-traded goods by virtue of
the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Balassa
1964 and Samuelson 1964): the price of
tradables is equalized across countries,
and convergence in living standards
implies that non tradables become rela-
tively more expensive. Consequently,
poorer regions in a currency area must
have higher CPI inflation.
6 Intuitively, we expect both market shares
to fall over time since world trade and the
world economy are outpacing growth in
France and Germany.
7 A slightly different picture emerges if
one uses OECD data instead of Eurostat
data, because the gap disappears in the
early two thousands. B. The evolution of unemployment and the policy
debate
As far as unemployment is concerned, the record
shows that France closely follows the euro area’s expe-
rience but at a somewhat higher rate. This difference is
fairly constant over time.7
The unemployment problem has been at the forefront
of the policy debate for decades. It has motivated a
large array of policies – including passive support to
the unemployed, employment protection, job creation
schemes in the public sector, deregulation of tempo-
rary contracts and reductions in employers’ social
security contributions. These policies have typically
replaced each other at a dizzying pace and represent a
large cumulative cost on the budget. Yet they do not
seem to have had a large impact.
France is now emerging from its
third major episode of a substan-
tial decline in unemployment.
The first of these episodes was in
the late 1980s, and the second one
from 1997 to 2001. None of these
episodes is explained by a sub-
stantial labour market reform;
rather they reflect international
business cycles. With the coming
recession it is likely that the cur-
rent episode will end and that
unemployment will again reach
some 9 percent. So far, though,
recent data show that unemploy-
ment bottomed at 7.6 percent in
March 2008, to increase again in
November to 7.9 percent. 
Thus, while a number of European countries seem to
have returned to permanently lower levels of unem-
ployment,8 France is in the club of those countries
where it remains high. We believe that this is for lack
of substantial labour reforms; although it should be
pointed out that the last two episodes of falling unem-
ployment have not triggered inflationary tensions.
This is somewhat paradoxical because in the absence
of structural reforms we expect the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate to stay constant. In principle, this
means that inflation should accelerate when unem-
ployment falls. One possible answer to this puzzle is
that the natural rate has fallen despite the lack of
reforms, say because the underlying trend of produc-
tivity growth is more favourable, or because the com-
position of the workforce gives a
great weight to groups with struc-
turally lower unemployment (e.g.,
the middle-aged vs. the young). If
so, we should expect unemploy-
ment to stabilise at say 7.5–8 per-
cent instead of returning to 9 per-
cent. Another possibility is that
the mechanism by which unem-
ployment returns to its long-run
level is no longer accelerating
inflation. One reason why this
may be so is that increased inter-
national competition makes it
more costly for firms to increase
their prices as this would entail a
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severe loss of competitiveness; on the other hand, it
makes it easier for them to outsource activities and
substitute imported intermediate inputs for domestic
workers. If this is true, an incipient fall of unemploy-
ment below the natural rate does not result in more
CPI inflation but rather in a direct fall in labour
demand, coupled with more outsourcing and greater
imports.
The recent evolution of unemployment looks less
favourable if one looks at its duration rather than its
level. This is reported in Figure 4.5. Over 25 years the
average duration of unemployment has never fallen
below 12 months. While the first two episodes of
falling unemployment were associated with a reduc-
tion in the average duration from an admittedly very
high initial level (16 months) to slightly above
12 months, the recent fall in unemployment is not
associated with a reduction in average duration. This
confirms the view that the labour market remains scle-
rotic and unfriendly to new entrants and suggests that
most of the decline comes from a fall in the rate at
which workers leave their jobs. 
C. The issue of labour contracts
As in a number of other countries, France has
attempted to make its labour market more flexible by
reforming employment protection. This has been
faced with substantial political opposition, and like
Spain, Italy and Portugal, France has gradually
reduced employment protection “at the margin” by
liberalising the use of temporary contracts while not
reducing the protection level associated with perma-
nent ones. As a result, temporary contracts now
account for some 70 percent of new hires. But because
there are severe restrictions on their duration and how
frequently they can be renewed, they only account for
15 percent of the stock of employment. To sum-
marise, most workers are now in one of two situa-
tions:
– A “determined duration contract” (CDD), which
cannot exceed 18 months and can only be used for
tasks that are “temporary in nature” (e.g., replac-
ing an absent employee, seasonal work, etc.)
– An “undetermined duration contract” (CDI),
which makes it quite difficult to lay off workers for
economic reasons, due to procedural difficulties
(obligation to prove the economic difficulties to a
judge; obligation to propose a plan for relocating
the workers into other jobs, etc.), litigation and
uncertainties (legal precedents of firms being
forced to rehire workers that it had laid off, etc.)
There has been a debate on the role of temporary con-
tracts in France. Some claim that they reinforce
labour market dualism by creating a class of have-
nots who move constantly between temporary jobs
and unemployment spells. If anything, this evidence is
not accurate. A large fraction of temporary job hold-
ers end up in permanent contracts and the probability
of getting a permanent contract is much larger for
temporary workers than for the unemployed. Some
also fear that despite this “happy ending” of labour
market trajectories, they are plagued by increased pre-
cariousness, and that this has costs in terms of say,
ability of workers to get loans, investment in human
capital, and so on. Despite much talk about it in the
media, increased precariousness is largely a myth.
Table 4.2 shows the evolution
over time of two variables. One is
the proportion of workers em-
ployed for less than a year, which
is a measure of precariousness.
The other is the proportion of
workers employed for more than
10 years. While we expect these
variables to be driven in part by
changes in the demographic com-
position of the population as well
as the economic cycle, we would
expect a substantial trend toward
shorter durations if precarious-
ness increased over time. Over a
period of 15 years the proportion
of workers having worked less
than a year in their current job is
Figure 4.5essentially unchanged. The same is true for the pro-
portion of workers employed for more than 10 years.
Thus there is no sign of increased precariousness.
While many economists call for uniform labour con-
tracts, in practice the use of temporary contracts has
proved to be the only politically viable way of making
the labour market more flexible. The reason is that it
gives firms a margin to manage their workforce while
preserving the interests of incumbent insiders. Thus,
recent hints at introducing a unique contract was met
with resistance from both the unions and employers:
while the former feared that the new contract would
be more flexible than permanent ones, the latter were
concerned that they would have less freedom if they
could not use temporary ones. As a result, reform of
employment protection has so far boiled down to a
limited agreement between the social partners (see
section 3.1B).
D. The minimum wage
One cornerstone of French redistributive policy is the
minimum wage. While in most countries the minimum
wage is sufficiently low to be con-
sidered as a minor distortion, this
is not the case in France. Figure
4.6 documents the secular rise of
the minimum wage in relative
terms since the late 1960s. While
there was a downward trend in
the 1960s, following the 1968
accords de Grenelle the minimum
wage jumped upwards by almost
20 percent. It was followed by
two successive hikes following
the election of Giscard d’Estaing
in 1974 and that of Mitterand in
1981. Since then the minimum
wage has remained stable at
around 60 percent of the median
wage. 
How high is this by international standards? This is
shown on Figure 4.7, which confirms that the French
minimum wage is the highest in Europe in relative
terms. 
The French minimum wage exerts a strong compres-
sion effect of wages at the bottom of the distribution
of income. The proportion of workers paid the mini-
mum wage has substantially increased over time. 
Figure 4.8 is taken from a working paper of the
French Ministry of Finance (2007) and depicts the
evolution of the proportion of workers paid the min-
imum wage over the last two decades. We note a sharp
increase in this proportion since the mid-1990s, peak-
ing at over 16 percent in 2005 (the corresponding
number for the United States is 2.5 percent). This is
the result of policies aimed at reducing the cost of
labour by reducing employer’s social security contri-
butions for low wage earners. As a result, these con-
tributions have become quite progressive as wages go
up beyond the minimum wage, which creates disin-
centives for employers to increase wages above the
minimum. Furthermore, these policies have mostly
opened the door for discretionary increases of the
take-home minimum wage, and thus had in the end
little negative impact on the total labour cost of the
minimum wage, except in their very first years. This
induced effect, of course, further increases the pro-
portion of minimum wage workers.
The current minimum wage trap is worrisome for a
number of reasons. First, the large number of work-
ers paid the minimum wage suggests that it is binding
for a large segment of the labour market and therefore
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Table 4.2 
Proportion of the employed in short and long 
employment spells









Source: OECD online data.
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that it destroys many jobs. In a well-known study,
Laroque and Salanié (2000) have found that a 10 per-
cent increase in the minimum wage in France would
destroy around 300,000 jobs, which means an increase
in the unemployment rate of 15 percent.9
Second, unskilled workers are discouraged from
acquiring skills: they now need a larger productivity
improvement than in the past to increase their take-
home wage by the same amount, due to the progres-
sivity of social security contributions. And those at
the very bottom of the distribution of earnings face
the additional problem that should they move up a
full decile, they would still be paid the minimum wage. 
To grasp how big these effects are, note that according
to the OECD in the United States the second decile of
the distribution of wages earns a third more than the
bottom decile. This suggests that
to move to the second decile, an
unskilled worker would have to
increase his productivity by a
third on average, which with esti-
mated returns to education is
equivalent to at least three extra
years of schooling. In France the
incentives to do so are virtually
non existent, since with 15 per-
cent minimum wage earners the
second decile is barely richer than
the first (it earns 11 percent more
on average). 
2.3 Fiscal policy
Having discussed the evolution of
employment in France, we now
turn to an important dimension of its macroeconom-
ic developments: fiscal policy and the size of govern-
ment. A stylized characterisation of France’s fiscal
policy could be as follows:
– A will to use budget deficits in slumps to stimulate
the economy
– An incapacity to run surpluses and re-balance the
budget during booms
The latter aspect is certainly due to political factors.
There is considerable temptation for politicians to
spend any incipient budget surplus in exchange for
political benefits. Furthermore, this is aggravated by
the fact that an increase in public spending is often the
outcome of distributive conflicts between special
interest groups.10
The result of this process, sum-
marized in Figure 4.9, is that
France has run a deficit every
single year since 1973 and
remains close to the 3 percent
Maastricht limit since the imple-
mentation of EMU (which,
along with German deficits, has
led to the de-facto repudiation of
the Growth and Stability Pact).
The deficit is bound to deterio-
rate sharply with the current
Figure 4.7
Figure 4.8
9 That is, if it were implemented now,
unemployment as a share of the work-
force would increase from some 8 percent
to 8 x 1.15 = 9.2 percent. 
10 See Alesina and Drazen (1991).recession and the expensive stim-
ulus package that was launched
in December 2008.
Because of this apparent inability
to run surpluses, the sustainabil-
ity of French fiscal policy ulti-
mately depends on the economy’s
growth rate: the debt/gdp ratio
improves somewhat in good
times and deteriorates quickly
during recessions. 
As Figure 4.10 shows, public debt
has drifted upward. The data
show no implicit target for the
debt/GDP ratio that policy mak-
ers would aim at. In particular,
episodes of rapid increases in
national debt, such as the sharp
recession of the mid-1990s, have
left a large and apparently per-
manent increase in public debt of
some 25 percent of GDP. If a
similar episode were to occur
again, we would expect an in-
crease of the same order of mag-
nitude and the debt/GDP ratio
would reach 90 percent, which
might become more and more
problematic. Indeed, the current
crisis suggests that there is every
reason to be worried about such a
possibility.
Of similar concern is the upward
drift in public employment, the
causes of which are further dis-
cussed below. 
As shown on Figure 4.11, public
employment as a share of total
employment experienced an
upward trend in the 1970s, with
two accelerations after 1981 and
1988 (i.e., after socialist victories
in elections). It peaked in 1994,
and has decreased somewhat
since then, but that is essentially
because its denominator, employ-
ment, has started growing. As a
result public employment is now
22.5 percent of the workforce,
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and reaches 25 percent if one
takes into account atypical public
entities such as the social security
administration and the post office.
This is very high by international
standards. 
Summary
The preceding analysis highlights
the three main challenges that
economic reform should address:
– A dismal long-term growth
performance
– An unemployment rate that remains high com-
pared to those countries that have escaped the
European unemployment dilemma
– An overbloated public sector
3. Economic reforms
Since the election of President Sarkozy in 2007, the
country has been engaged in an unprecedented wave
of reforms, especially in contrast to Chirac’s last term
(2002–2007) where little was achieved on the econom-
ic front except the 2003 partial pension reform and the
ill-fated new targeted flexible labour contracts intro-
duce by the Villepin government in 2006.
3.1 What reforms?
The reforms that have been implemented are broad
and eclectic and are based on different philosophies
and paradigms. They are so numerous that the sheer
task of presenting them is itself a challenge. We
choose to group them into five main blocks: tax poli-
cy, labour markets, goods markets, the welfare state
and the government.
A. The Fiscal Package
The so-called Fiscal Package (paquet fiscal), part of
Sarkozy’s electoral platform, was implemented imme-
diately after the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions of 2007. Its stated philosophy is “work more to
earn more”. The package is eclectic and includes tax
breaks on overtime work, subsidisation of mortgage
payments as well as the elimination of (some) taxes on
bequests. It is clearly meant to appeal to the middle
class/upper middle class voters, who are highly repre-
sented among the Sarkozy electorate. Overall, these
reforms (described in Box 4.1) should increase the
incentives to work and accumulate wealth – which
should translate into a greater stock of capital. But
the inspiration and economic rationale of these
reforms is not totally clear. In particular, they have
not been carefully designed on the basis of cost/bene-
fit considerations.
The tax cuts for overtime increase incentives to work
on the intensive margin.11 Many analysts have criti-
cised them on the grounds that the real problem is
low employment, not low hours per person, so that
acting on the extensive margin would have been
more appropriate. However, it makes economic sense
to tax marginal hours at a lower rate than inframar-
ginal hours, since it is the latter that matter when
workers and firms are setting their working time
optimally. But the extensive margin matters too
when it comes to the arbitrage between working and
not working, which is key to the determination of
the employment rate. Thus we think that the fiscal
effort should have been more balanced, i.e,. one
should have lowered payroll taxes on non-overtime
work instead of having a very large subsidy on over-
time only; the effects on employment would have
been more favourable. Also, many economists think
that firms can “cheat” on the scheme by giving wage
increases in the form of fictitious overtime. If these
concerns are true, then the scheme would involve a
substantial deadweight loss (although a good side
effect is that it then becomes an employment subsidy
and acts on the extensive margin). 
11 One typically distinguishes the margins of adjustment: the “inten-
sive” margin, where the intensity of activity goes up and the “exten-
sive”one, where inactive units become active. This distinction applies
to all sorts of contexts. In the employment context, the intensive
margin means more hours by employed workers, and the extensive
margin means more employed workers.
Box 4.1 
The Fiscal Package
The Fiscal Package was the first series of economic measures of the
Sarkozy administration. The general philosophy is to enhance people’s 
incentives to work and accumulate. The four key measures of the Fiscal
Package are: 
• Introducing a ceiling of 50 percent on the total taxes paid by 
any household (the so-called fiscal shield or bouclier fiscal):
Fiscal authorities now collate all the taxes paid by a house- 
hold and send a refund for all taxes paid in excess of 50 per- 
cent of their income. 
• A full-income tax credit for all overtime hours, coupled with
a reduction in payroll taxes for these hours.
•   An income tax credit for interest payments on mortgages.
• Suppression of inheritance taxes whenever the beneficiary is
 the spouse.Similarly, the tax cut on mortgage payments is likely
to be largely dissipated in the form of higher house
prices: it is a poor idea to subsidize the demand for
housing, especially in areas that are densely populat-
ed and highly regulated, where the response of con-
struction to an increase in house prices is not very
strong. The main effect of the reform is to transfer
money from taxpayers to those who initially own real
estate. Worse, because the subsidy is in the form of a
tax deduction, the poorest households (who pay a
zero income tax) cannot access them, despite suffer-
ing from the higher house prices induced by the poli-
cy. Therefore, this policy is not only ineffective in
solving the housing problem, it is also increases
inequality. Instead of subsidising mortgage pay-
ments, it would have been better to reduce the taxes
on transactions that amount to around 10 percent of
the value of the good being sold. Such a reduction
would have favoured increased turnover on housing
markets, hence reducing the average delay for selling
or buying a home, and it would have made housing
genuinely cheaper for buyers (and more profitable for
sellers).
B. Labour market reforms
In France, labour contracts are heavily regulated. The
law that governs industrial relations, the code du tra-
vail, has tens of thousands of pages. De-regulating
the labour market, especially in the area of termina-
tion, has long been a centre-piece of the public
debate. Yet it has proved quite difficult. The history
of right-wing governments in France is that of vio-
lent street protests against reforms that increased
labour market flexibility and were subsequently with-
drawn (the other two traditional triggers of such
protests being pension reforms and reforms of the
educational system). 
In the aftermath of yet another failure to make the
labour market more flexible by the preceding Villepin
government, the Sarkozy administration has relied on
collective bargaining to reach an agreement on labour
market reforms. It has given a deadline to employers’
associations and trade unions with the threat that if
no agreement was reached by that deadline, it would
impose its own law. The result is the 11 January 2008
agreement, which is described in Box 4.2. 
Overall, the agreement reduces the legal uncertainties
associated with termination of the employment rela-
tionship. This makes it somewhat easier for firms to
lay off workers. At the same time, statutory severance
payments are increased and some employer-based
benefits are made more portable. The reform moves a
small step in the direction of substituting protection
of people for protection of jobs, in accordance with
the very fashionable “flexicurity” philosophy.
But the move is not revolutionary and should only
have a moderate effect on job creation. Its caution is
exemplified by one of the items of the agreement, the
“determined object contract”. As in Italy and Spain,
firms try to achieve flexibility by hiring under fixed-
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Box 4.2 
The labour market agreement of 11 January 2008 
In January 2008, French employers and union representatives signed an agreement about reforming the laws
governing labour contracts, in particular with respect to the conditions of termination. The social partners were
under strong pressure by the government to bargain over these issues, as the government had threatened to
impose a law and ignore them should they fail to reach an agreement by a given deadline.
The key points of the agreement that was signed on 11 January 2008 are as follows:
Introduction of a severance procedure “by mutual agreement”. Under this procedure, the employee is entitled to
unemployment benefits as if he had been involuntarily laid off, as well as to a severance payment. On the other 
hand, the scope for litigation after the separation has occurred is severely restricted. The mandated level of 
severance payment used to be equal to 10 percent of the monthly wage per year of tenure. It was small by
European standards even though dismissals were made quite difficult for the firm due to many restrictions. The
agreement doubles that level. The new mandated severance payment also applies to separation by mutual agree-
ments.
Portability of fringe benefits into periods of unemployment: laid-off workers can now continue to draw fringe
benefits (like supplementary health insurance) associated with their previous job during part of their 
unemployment spell. The motivation for that measure is to eliminate a disincentive for mobility associated with
the automatic loss of these benefits when one loses one’s job.
The new “determined mission contract” (CMD), which can last between 18 months and 36 months. It is
however limited to executives and engineers. The approximate duration of the mission must be written in the 
contract, and the employee must be informed about the termination of the mission at least two months in
advance.EEAG Report 2009 151
Chapter 4
term contracts as much as they can. The impossibili-
ty to renew a fixed term contract beyond 18 months
implies that, to obtain such flexibility, firms must get
rid of valuable employees after 18 months or else
convert their contract into a CDI and bear a much
higher level of employment protection. For that rea-
son, for years employers’ associations have lobbied
for a “project contract”, which allows firms to hire
workers for the entire duration of a given project.
This would conciliate flexibility with better consis-
tency in the firm’s recruitment policy and better
opportunities for the workers hired under temporary
contracts to accumulate valuable human capital,
which in turn would improve their career opportuni-
ties and the likelihood that they get a permanent con-
tract. While the original plan by employers was a 
5-year contract, the agreement only allows for a 
3-year contract which only applies to fairly skilled
workers. This is more like a super CDD for the skilled
than a genuine project contract. 
On the downside, the reform tends to increase the
incentives for workers to be unemployed. As Box 4.2
shows, it involves greater portability of a number of
social benefits when people lose their jobs. Portability
generally makes it easier for workers to change jobs
and should be commended. But here the counterpart
of greater portability is an increase in both the effec-
tive severance payment and the effective unemploy-
ment benefit replacement ratio. For example, laid off
workers can keep supplementary health insurance for
7 months. But both parties, the employer and the
employee, have to pay their share. This is unfortunate:
the employer’s share acts as an additional severance
payment, but it is paid only as long as the worker does
not find another job. This cumulates the negative
effects of severance payment on job creation with the
negative effects of unemployment benefits on job
search. Ideally, employer-based benefits should be
abolished; they have no economic rationale, workers
could get higher wages instead and purchase whatev-
er benefit they want on the market. The distortions
associated with portability problems would then dis-
appear. To summarize, while reducing non-wage
labour costs, the agreement has increased the incen-
tives by firms and workers to inefficiently rely on the
unemployment benefit system in terminating employ-
ment when they would not want to do so if unem-
ployment benefits did not exist. 
Another intervention in the labour market took place
in October 2008. The government put together a
package to fight the incipient rise in unemployment
triggered by the slowdown in the world economy.
These hasty measures contradict to some extent the
structural approach underlying the process for
reforming labour contracts.
The package involves a variety of measures of differ-
ent quantitative significance. The most salient ones
are the introduction of 100,000 subsidised jobs in the
non-business sector and the generalisation of the so-
called  contrat de transition professionnelle (CTP),
which is a kind of super-unemployment benefit
scheme reserved for workers who lose their jobs in
large firms and involves generous benefits along with
special counselling and training. 
The first measure is a revamping of old policies that
were especially popular with the Left (in 1997 the
Jospin government created the so-called emploi jeunes,
which offered low-paid temporary public sector jobs
to recent school leavers), and it is in contradiction
with the Right’s usual stance that one should refrain
from creating jobs in the non-business sector (The
emploi jeunes was discontinued after the Right
assumed power in 2002.) In general, there is much
scepticism about the scheme’s efficacy.
The second measure, the extension of the CTP, is con-
sistent with the general “flexicurity” philosophy, but
by its very nature this scheme benefits “insiders” and
does nothing to increase competition from outsiders
in the labour market – indeed, the same can be said of
the subsidised jobs, which withdraw outsiders from
active job search while locking them in jobs of little
productive value. 
Also, there is some confusion in the whole approach
between structural measures aimed at reducing the
long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment and
cyclical ones that are supposed to combat a recession.
Structural measures exert their effects only after a
while and are an inappropriate tool for stabilising
business cycles.12
C. Goods markets : The Attali Commission and the 
Loi de modernisation économique
Immediately after being elected, President Sarkozy
appointed Jacques Attali, a former EBRD CEO and
special advisor to Mitterand to head a commission
with the goal of proposing reforms to boost the coun-
12 Furthermore, it is arguably politically easier to introduce them in
booms, although that is debatable. See Saint-Paul (2002).try’s growth and competitiveness.13 The appointment
took place in the context of the debate on France’s
relative economic decline. The commission, with a
very eclectic membership that included economists,
top civil servants, sociologists, historians, philoso-
phers, and so on, built on previous reports that point-
ed out rigidities in many different areas such as regu-
lations of good markets and retail trade, rigidities of
the educational system, lack of access of small firms
to credit markets, and so on. The outcome of the
commission was the loi de modernisation économique,
a catalogue of measures of various importance
(Box 4.3). It should be noted that in the context of the
debates associated with the law, the government suf-
fered a setback as taxi drivers mobilised against one
of the most advertised propositions of the Attali
Commission, namely the elimination of the quotas
for taxi licenses (See Box 4.4).
D. Welfare reform: Pensions and the revenu de solidarité
active 
The problem of financing pensions in France is not as
large as in other European countries thanks to more
favourable demographics. Nevertheless, the accounts
are far from balanced and the problem has been
aggravated by a reduction of the retirement age to 60
in the early 1980s as well as an excessive reliance on
pre-retirement schemes to cope with the unemploy-
ment problem. As illustrated in Table 4.3, this meant
that the labour supply of elderly workers was quite
low by international standards.
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Box 4.3 
The Attali Commission and the loi de modernisation économique
In the spring of 2008 the so-called loi de modernisation de l’économie was enacted. Its goal is to enhance the 
country’s growth and competitiveness by lifting a number of barriers to economic activity. The law is broad and 
encompassing and can be summarised by 10 key items:
Creation of the status of auto-entrepreneur: this measure is targeted at people who want to start their own 
business. The auto-entrepreneur is spared all the red tape and pays a flat tax that replaces all social security
contributions and income tax. He or she does not pay corporate taxes and does not pay the so-called taxe
professionnelle (yet another tax on businesses) during the first three years. Pension rights are accumulated
automatically, although it is unclear at what rate. An individual is eligible to that status only with a yearly
turnover below 80,000 Euros for commercial activities and 32,000 Euros for services. The income tax 
deductibility only applies to the bottom three tax brackets.
Easing the life of small businesses: this allows entrepreneurs to shelter a greater fraction of their personal
assets from creditors in case of bankruptcy (while letting them opt out from such protection for some assets if
they want to improve their access to credit). Also, some threshold effects in payroll taxes are smoothed,
although this is “experimental” and will be reviewed in 2010.
Granting preferential access to public procurement for “innovating” small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Reducing payment deadlines between firms. Important tax reductions for the inheritance of businesses,
whenever the beneficiaries are family members and/or employees.
Easing regulation on retail trade. While administrative approval was needed to open a retail outlet of more
than 300m
2, the threshold is now 1000m
2. Furthermore, representatives of competitors can no longer be
members of the administrative commissions that are granting the approvals. Also, those commissions can no 
longer deny the permits on the grounds of “lack of economic need” but can only do so on environmental and
urbanistic criteria. Finally, “back margins” are declared illegal. Back margins are a practice by which a supplier 
pays a retail outlet for the right to have its product sold at that outlet. The difference between back margins and
lower supply prices is that the law prohibits selling below cost. Thus, back margins allow supermarkets to buy 
at a low effective cost while tying their own hands to charge high prices by maintaining high theoretical costs:
it is an indirect way of sustaining collusion among the leading supermarket brands. The abolition of back
margins forces supermarkets to negotiate price reductions with their suppliers, thereby eliminating the collusion
technology.
Liberalising sales: the new law involves a marginal liberalization of sales. While in the past sales could take 
place 10 weeks a year, and these 10 weeks were uniformly set by the government’s representative, (the préfet), 
there are now only 8 such weeks, but each business can have sales during two extra weeks of its choice. While 
this is surely marginal, it could nevertheless have a large impact on competition. In a way, restricting sales
enforced collusion in the retail sector. A seller could not lower its price except during the sales season. Now,
sellers have an incentive to “deviate” from such collusion since they can boost their turnover considerably by 
having a sale at a time when others do not have it. As a result it is hoped that the level of prices sustained by 
collusion will be lowered more than suggested by the modest size of the move.
13 The Attali (2008) Report is available online at 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/084000041/0000
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Pension reform was initiated in 1994 and then pro-
ceeded at a slow pace amidst strong opposition by
organized interests. 
The French pension system is segmented in a way that
involves large inequalities between groups of workers.
The “general regime” involves
dependent employees of the pri-
vate sector and is the less gener-
ous. Civil servants have a more
generous regime of their own, for
the same rate of contribution –
meaning the regime is more in-
solvent than the general regime.
Finally, so-called “special re-
gimes” are even more generous
and involve an earlier retirement
age. These typically involve a
number of large public firms, like
Electricité de France, the train
company SNCF and the Banque
de France. As of 2008 the ratio
between contributors and pen-
sioners in these regimes is 1:2
meaning they are actually bank-
rupt and that the pensions are
paid by the taxpayer.
In 1994, the required duration of
contributions to be eligible for
retirement was increased for the “general regime” –
i.e., dependent employees of the private sector – from
37.5 years to 40 years. Furthermore, the pension level
was now a proportion of the average wage in the past
25 years rather than the past 10 years. Finally, pen-
sions were indexed on prices, not
on wages. However, the regime of
civil servants as well as the “spe-
cial regimes”were left untouched.
In that respect, the reform
increased the inequality between
civil servants and special regimes
and the general regime: all the
burden of the adjustment was
borne by the general regime,
which was already disadvantaged
compared to the other two
regimes. A key political issue was
the alignment of the two privi-
leged regimes with the general
regime. In 1995, the Juppé gov-
ernment tried to reform the spe-
cial regimes and align them with
the civil service regime. This
reform touched off violent
protests and was withdrawn. Two
years later, the Right lost the elec-
tion. The new socialist govern-
ment did not attempt any pension
Box 4.4 
The French Taxi conundrum
In France, the profession of independent taxi driver is heavily regulated.
To operate, one needs to take an exam which is relatively complex
compared to the actual task of driving a taxi, and involves the French
language, the regulation of the taxi industry, traffic rules and driving
(which is redundant with the requirements for simply having a driver’s 
license), rescue techniques, management and local topography. Further-
more, one needs to purchase a license, and the total number of licenses
is fixed by the government. The number of taxis in Paris in 1992 was 
only 15,000, as opposed to 20,000 in 1931 and 25,000 in 1925. That
number did not increase until 2003, when 1,500 new licenses were 
issued. New licenses are given for free to candidates who are on the
waiting list. The others must purchase a license on the secondary
market. The value of a license in Paris is 120,000 euros. Last but not
least, each license restricts operations to a specific zone. Taxis are not
allowed to accept fares that do not start in their zone. Thus, for example,
a taxi parisien is allowed to operate in central Paris plus the immediate
suburbs, but not in more remote suburbs. A taxi that transports a 
customer from Paris to Fontainebleau is obliged by law to return to Paris 
empty.
In 2008, French taxi drivers mobilised against proposals by the Attali
Commission to deregulate the market for taxis, even before any attempt
by the Parliament to write it into the law. Perhaps because taxi drivers
are a traditional constituency for the Right, the government has given in,
and taxis have been left out of the loi de modernisation de l’économie. 
Table 4.3 
Employment/population ratio for the 55 to 64 years old,
1994 and 2007
Country 1994 2007 (2007)–(1994)
Austria 28.4 38.6 + 10.2
Belgium 22.4 33.8 + 11.4
Czech Republic 32.3 46.0 + 13.7
Denmark 50.2 58.7 +   8.5
Finland 33.5 55.0 + 21.5
France 33.4 37.9 +   4.5
Germany 35.9 52.0 + 16.1
Greece 39.5 42.1 +   2.6
Hungary 31.1 33.1 +   2.0
Ireland 39.5 54.1 + 14.6
Italy 29.4 33.8 +   4.4
Netherlands 29.0 50.1 + 21.1
Norway 61.6 69.0 +   7.4
Poland 34.4 29.7 –   4.7
Portugal 45.9 50.9 +   5.0
Slovakia 21.3 35.7 + 14.4
Spain 32.7 44.6 + 11.9
Sweden 61.9 70.1 +   8.2
Switzerland 61.1 67.2 +   6.1
United Kingdom 47.4 57.4 + 10.0
United States 54.4 61.8 +   7.4
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2008).reform. In 2003, after the 2002 victory of the Right,
the Raffarin government successfully implemented
(despite violent opposition) the so-called “Fillon
reform”, which set the required duration of contribu-
tion for civil servants equal to that of the general
regime, while planning a gradual increase over time of
the duration of contributions, which was now indexed
on the average life expectancy.14 The reform is proba-
bly insufficient to guarantee the financing of the pen-
sion system, and further increases in the level and/or
duration of contributions are to be expected. While
the increase in the duration of contributions for civil
servants is commendable on equity grounds, it is not
clear how long it will continue from a budgetary per-
spective. After all, civil servants are paid by the gov-
ernment and the net savings generated by the measure
depends on the ability to substitute elderly workers for
younger workers in the public sector. If the level of
substitutability is low, one may well observe an
increase in the number of civil servants, which will
eliminate the gains of the reform to the (consolidated)
public sector, especially since a working civil servant is
more costly to the budget than a retired one. 
As Table 4.3 shows, despite the reform the labour par-
ticipation rate of older workers has only increased
modestly in France as compared with other countries
and it remains far below 50 percent.
Against that background, the Sarkozy government
managed against all odds to implement a reform of
the fearsome special regimes that had inflicted so
much damage on the Juppé government. The reform
plans to align the required duration of contributions
with those of other regimes to 40 years by 2012,
although a provision says that if that duration were to
increase – which is very likely – the special regimes
will follow with a 4-year lag.15
Introducing incentives in welfare
More recently, and borrowing ideas from the Left, the
government has moved to replace the basic assistance
income (RMI), which creates an inactivity trap by
making it unprofitable to work half-time at the mini-
mum wage compared to being on welfare by a new
system called RSA (See Box 4.5). The new system
eliminates the inactivity trap by introducing a gradual
reduction in welfare payments as hours worked go up.
As a result there is (almost) no zone at the bottom of
the distribution of income with confiscatory marginal
tax rates. 
The reduction in the trap involves an increase in the
amounts redistributed and therefore a cost to the bud-
get. As a result, the government has created a new tax
on capital income which has been much criticised by
employers’ associations and the parliamentary Right. 
The new system could hardly have been better
designed as it is based on the goals of increasing
incentives to work while not reducing the level of
income support granted to those out of work. But it
has created a new concern about an excess use of part-
time work, as discussed in section 3.2. Politically, it
has added to the confusion about the actual stance of
the government, which had been already generated by
the appointment of socialist ministers and the delega-
tion of policy design to a prominent socialist advisor
to Mitterand.
While we do not dispute the positive incentive effects
of RSA on non-working welfare recipients, it has two
economic shortcomings.
First, full-time workers at the minimum wage may
take advantage of it to work part-time. This would
result in an overall reduction in hours worked and in
a strong pressure on the budget. At face value, one
might be tempted to dismiss this claim: at a marginal
tax rate of 38 percent a reduction in pre-tax income of
around 500 euros would entail a loss of 0.62 x 500 =
310 euros per month, which is far from negligible at
such low incomes. However, the picture changes con-
siderably if one brings other dimensions of the redis-
tributive system back into the picture. First, like the
RMI before it, the RSA part of an individual’s
income will not be subject to (most of) employees’
social security contributions. However, the wage part
will remain subject to those taxes. If one takes that
into account, the marginal tax rate for RSA recipients
is no longer 0.38 but the sum of the employee’s social
security contribution rate (about 20 percent) and the
marginal tax rate of the RSA system, i.e., 0.38 + 0.20
= 0.58. The loss from a 500 euros income loss is now
0.42 x 500 = 210 euros per month. This is not the end
of the story, though, because being on welfare is asso-
ciated with a number of other fringe benefits. The
most important one is the CMU (couverture maladie
universelle), which grants free and total medical cov-
erage for any person whose monthly income is below
a certain threshold (621 euros for a single person). In
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14 Contrary to reforms in other countries, a funded pillar was not
introduced, and the degree of individual choice remains quite mod-
est.
15 See  http://archives.lesechos.fr/archives/2008/lesechos.fr/
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itself, the CMU creates a big poverty trap. But the
RSA reform makes the situation worse because it is
affordable to live below the threshold, since the RSA
income is not taken into account when determining
eligibility to CMU. While there is no way to purchase
complete coverage of all expenses on the market,
good health insurance for a single person is worth
around 100 euros per month. That is therefore the
value of the CMU, implying that an increase in earn-
ings from 621 to 622 euros amounts to a 100 euro fall
in net income. 
Another aspect is that the RSA part of the income is
non-taxable, while wages are taxable. Finally, welfare
recipients are eligible to a host of in-kind benefits, not
least because local administrations typically add their
own layer of redistribution to
that of the central level. These in-
kind advantages include exonera-
tion of taxes on dwellings (taxe
d’habitation), TV sets (rede-
vance), subsidised rates for
phone calls, free public trans-
portation, and, last but not least,
the “Christmas bonus”, which
amounts to 150 euros for a single
individual and is topped-up by
local authorities – e.g., the de-
partment of Bouches-du-Rhône
adds another 115 euros to the
state Christmas premium. It is
unclear how these benefits will be
transformed when the new RSA
comes into place; the most likely
Box 4.5 
Changes in social protection: the RSA (revenu de solidarité active) 
A key reform of social protection is the introduction of a scheme called revenu de solidarité active, which is a 
form of earned income tax credit for low earners. The scheme is meant to replace an important inactivity trap
that made it unprofitable for those on welfare to take a part-time job at the minimum wage. The reason is that
any hour worked eliminated eligibility to the RMI (revenu minimum d’insertion), a basic assistance programme
which pays around 500 euros per month if one includes a related housing benefit called APL.
The new scheme eliminates the inactivity trap by smoothing the amount transferred to the worker as hours 
increase instead of brutally eliminating the transfer at the first hour worked. Figure 4.12 illustrates how the
system works. In the initial situation there is an infinite marginal tax rate at zero income, followed by a zero
marginal tax rate up to the minimum wage (depending on the family situation). Of course, in effect that means 
that nobody has an incentive to work for a monthly amount that is below the RMI, i.e. to be a part-timer at the 
hourly minimum wage. The new system leaves the income floor untouched and smoothes marginal tax rates by 
increasing the generosity of welfare payments. As a result there is a uniform marginal tax rate of 38 percent for 
all incomes below 1.04 times the minimum wage, after which the supplementary income vanishes and the 
worker faces the regular income tax schedule, which means a substantial drop in the marginal tax rate as one 
passes above the threshold.
1
As Figure 4.12 makes clear, the RSA increases the overall level of redistribution and is costly to the budget.
Estimates are around 10 billion euros per year and a new tax on capital income has been introduced to finance 
these costs.
Clearly, the incentives to take a part-time job instead of remaining unemployed are now much larger than in the 
past. To be sure, the blue line in Figure 4.12 is only a stylized representation of the previous system. Preceding
governments had already implemented modest, partial solutions to the inactivity trap by means of the so-called
prime à l’emploi (a small income tax deduction for workers) and ristourne (a scheme that allowed the
unemployed to cumulate RMI with their wages for 12months, but denied this to those who took employment
without having been through welfare). While one may argue that the new system is merely consolidating and 
simplifying these preceding schemes, and will therefore have little effect, it is in fact far more transparent, not
prone to discretionary manipulation (unlike the ristourne) and involves greater monetary incentives.
1 These marginal tax rates are only partial in that they ignore social security contributions. Of course, when all taxes including
VAT and payroll taxes are taken into account, marginal tax rates are very high in France.
Figure 4.12outcome is that they will be conditional on some
income cap, thus becoming similar to the CMU.
Let us illustrate how serious the problem can become
with a simple numerical example. Table 4.4 provides a
back-of-the-envelope computation of the effects of
the new system on the incentives to work part-time. It
takes into account the employee’s social security con-
tributions, the RSA, the CMU valued at 100 euros per
month, and the personal income tax. Other benefits
such as the Christmas premium, etc., are ignored; our
computations therefore understate the incentives to
move from full-time to part-time work – i.e., they
overstate the marginal hourly wage associated with
such a move.
We consider a minimum wage earner who reduces his
working time from 35 hours a week to 20 hours a
week. The reduction in net income puts him below the
threshold for eligibility to full medical coverage
(CMU), which is 621 euros per month; he is thus eli-
gible for CMU as well as for RSA, which is non-tax-
able and does not overturn eligibility to CMU. We
find a total post-tax, monthly income for part-timers
equal to 925 euros, versus 1007 euros for the full timer.
The difference is only 82 euros16 per month, for a dif-
ference in hours worked of about 4*15 = 60. The actu-
al net marginal wage is therefore only equal to 82/60
= 1.37 euros per hour. These computations suggest
that it makes economic sense for full-time minimum
wage earners to reduce their working time to 20 hours
a week. 
Given that a full 15 percent of French employees
work at the minimum wage, this would lead to a con-
siderable loss of total hours worked on the order of
magnitude of 3 to 4 percent.17 Of course, this will be
compensated by an increase in the hours worked of
those who will move from unemployment to part-time
work. But, ironically, the net effect looks much like
the infamous 35-hour week: a work-sharing scheme
which induces stagnation or a fall in total hours
worked, at a large cost to the taxpayer!
Second, the RSA ignores the demand side. Most of
these workers will have minimum wage jobs and
should the RSA increase the total supply of hours of
the low-skilled, employers have no interest to absorb
them unless the cost of labour falls. This suggests that
a lot of the benefit of the RSA is going to be lost
because of the minimum wage. This negative conse-
quence would have been avoided if the government
had used the RSA as an opportunity to reduce the
minimum wage, replacing a distortionary and job-
destroying form of support (the RSA) by another one
with much better incentive properties. But this would
have substantially increased the cost to the taxpayer,
as part of the burden of redistribution will be redis-
tributed from employers to the budget, although that
argument has little economic meaning since the mini-
mum wage is in fact a disguised form of tax on the
employed. 
E. Reforming the public sector
Finally, measures are being implemented to reduce or
at least contain the size of the public sector and
ensure the financing of the welfare state in the long
run.
The size of government
In terms of the overall burden of public expenditure,
France consistently ranks within the top 3 among
developed countries, along with Sweden and
Denmark. Over time, the size of the public sector has
grown due to several factors:
– The development of a lavish welfare state (basic
minimum income, complete universal health care
for the poor, early retirement, working time reduc-
tion, in-kind subsidies, etc.).
– The decentralisation reform of the 1980s which
transferred power to local governments. This led to
an increase in the number of local civil servants
which was not matched by an equal fall in civil ser-
vants at the central level.
– The lengthening of the time spent in the educa-
tional system and the uniformity of state-imposed
degree requirements for many professions.
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Table 4.4 
The part-time option in the RSA system
Hours worked per week 20 35
Gross wage 755 1321
Net wage (1) 593 1037
RSA (2) 235 0
CMU (3) 100 0
Personal Income tax (4) 3 30
Total (1)+(2)+(3)-(4) 925 1007
16 This would fall to some 62 euros if the move involved the gain of
a Christmas bonus, some 40 euros if in addition one were to be
spared the taxe d’habitation and the redevance, and would end up well
below zero if one also takes into account free public transportation.
17 Assume that out of these 15 percent of employees, two-third
moves to the part-time option. They reduce their working time by a
fraction (35-20)/35 = 3/7. The total reduction in hours worked will be
3/7 times 10 percent, i.e., some 4.2 percent.EEAG Report 2009 157
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– The incrementality of reforms, which tends to add
layers of administration on top of existing layers.
– The resolution of political stalemates through sub-
sidy schemes.
– Policies that reduced unemployment statistics
through job creation schemes in state and local
administrations.
With total government expenditures around 54 per-
cent of GDP, there seems to be no room for further
public-sector growth. This has led to timid attempts
to reduce the number of civil servants, which stands
at about 25 percent of total employment if all
administrations are taken into account. Because
these enjoy employment security, and because vol-
untary flows to the private sector are very small (not
least because for almost all skill levels the public
sector has higher wages and better pensions), the
only way to reduce public employment is by using
retirement flows. That is what the government has
started doing, with about 30 percent to 50 percent of
retirees not being replaced (also, monetary incen-
tives to leave the public sector have been intro-
duced). The implied order of magnitude is 20,000 to
30,000 per year, i.e., some 0.4 to 0.6 percent per
year. This means that it would take 20 years to
reduce public employment by some 10 percent. That
would reduce it to say 22 percent of total employ-
ment, which remains very high by international
standards. Furthermore, this is the best case sce-
nario, since local authorities may offset part of the
downsizing by increasing their workforce. 
The révision générale des politiques publiques
(RGPP)
In parallel, the government is implementing a long-
term, potentially far-reaching reform of the entire
internal organisation of the public sector. These
changes could pave the way for much larger reduc-
tions in its size in the future than the modest steps that
are being taken right now. It is beyond the scope of
this report to describe the RGPP in its entirety since
all dimensions of the administration are involved.18
Two key ideas driving the reforms are:
– Introducing incentives in the management of the
public sector,
– Merging administrations whenever synergies or
duplication of tasks appear.
Some of the aspects of RGPP are easy to understand,
like the planned reduction in military personnel by
54,000 soldiers, the transition of 20 universities to a
regime that will allow them to manage their budget in
an autonomous fashion and recruit workers under
private law contracts (although this reform fails on
two key accounts: the ability of universities to select
their students and their ability to charge tuition fees),
or numerous mergers of services with similar goals in
the central administration. For example, in April 2008
it was decided to merge the Ministry of Commerce’s
statistical service with INSEE, the national statistical
institute.
Others are more complex and involve the creation of
new agencies and committees to improve co-ordina-
tion and/or governance. It is not always clear that
these committees are of any use. For example, in April
2008 an authority was created whose task is to “guar-
antee the independence of the statistical system”. It is
unclear how the authority will work and how inde-
pendent it will be; nor has there been any obvious
concern that the statistical system’s lack of indepen-
dence has led to unreliable numbers. 
The sheer scope and complexity of the project makes
it very difficult to evaluate. At this stage, the overall
assessment made by the EEAG group is positive. The
reason is that the majority of measures involve cost-
cutting, simplifying and better incentives. But the
devil is in the details and the details are very difficult
to infer from official documents. The two main risks
are that the new agencies will grow out of proportion
and become sclerotic, which would render the whole
exercise obsolete and that the efficiency gains generat-
ed by RGPP in the central administration are offset by
an increase in size and slackness at the level of the
local administrations.
In the longer run, RGPP has the potential to have
quite positive effects on France’s economic growth,
through a mechanism which is seldom mentioned in
the debate but is likely to be relevant: the allocation of
talent. It has been recognised, in particular by authors
such as Murphy et al. (1991), that the career choices
of the most talented individuals in society have a pro-
found impact on growth. Typically, we expect more
growth if those individuals elect to be engineers, sci-
entists and innovators than if they become politicians,
lawyers or bureaucrats (or in the past “mandarins” or
fermiers generaux). This choice in turn depends on the
reward structure offered by society; if top level
bureaucrats have a high status and/or pay then the
18 Description and monitoring of the whole RGPP is available on the
following government website:
http://www.rgpp.modernisation.gouv.fr/most talented individuals will select those careers
instead of more innovative jobs. In France these posi-
tions are traditionally quite prestigious; while they are
not particularly well paid they open the door to top-
level careers in large firms, politics or international
organizations. The RGPP, however, intends to sub-
stantially reduce the number of high-level executive
positions in public service. As a result public service
will be less attractive to young talented individuals
because of deteriorated career prospects. This is
because the alternative careers that they will choose
good news probably have a greater social value, but
this also means that the government itself will be
more poorly managed, which will partly offset the
direct efficiency gains induced by RGPP.19
3.2 Assessing the reforms
The sheer scope of the reforms makes it obviously dif-
ficult to assess them. It is natural to believe that there
is radical change under way and that France is enter-
ing a now totally different policy regime. Yet closer
scrutiny shows that many of the shortcomings of pre-
vious approaches are still there, which casts doubts on
the efficiency of the reforms. In particular, the quan-
titative impact of the reforms will be reduced by three
features that have always harmed French economic
policy: incrementality, complexity and reversibility.
Furthermore, the reforms follow contradictory moti-
vations and principles that stem from conflicting pa-
radigms—thus the reforms lack a clear direction and
it is difficult for economic agents to form expectations
about the future policy stance.
Three weaknesses
The catalogue of reforms that we have established is
impressive in its breadth. Another question, though,
is whether the reforms are far-reaching, taken indi-
vidually. 
Traditionally, French reforms have suffered from
three flaws:
– Incrementality: Rather than aiming at a deep
change of the existing system, most often reform
intervenes at its margin, often by adding new limit-
ed schemes. The Sarkozy measures are no excep-
tion. The standard regime for labour contracts is
unchanged – new restricted contracts are being
introduced. Instead of eliminating the difficulties
and ordeals of running a business, another catego-
ry of business has been defined that escapes these
rules but which is restricted in its composition and
has a very restrictive cap in terms of turnover.
Regulation and taxes of the housing sectors are
unchanged but only marginally offset by an addi-
tional tax deduction (which adds to the complexi-
ty of the income tax). 
– Complexity: the French legal system is one of the
most complex in the world. French labour law, for
example, has tens of thousands of pages.
Complexity is evident in the number of different
taxes, the proliferation of competing jurisdictional
levels, the number of targeted subsidies to various
activities, etc. The more complex the system, the
more difficult it is to operate. This means that poli-
cies do not have their intended effect, either
because their interaction with the pre-existing sys-
tem is neglected, or because lower levels of author-
ity have considerable discretion in applying the law,
as it is practically impossible to apply it entirely.
Thus, a complex environment makes reform more
problematic. One may even go as far as to claim
that a prerequisite for reform would be to eliminate
this complexity. Yet the recent reform waves consist
of incremental add-ons. This makes them difficult
to evaluate and more likely to have perverse effects
or be cancelled by discretionary behaviour at lower
levels.
– Reversals: reforms have often been reversed in the
face of political opposition, political changes or
subsequent renegotiations. The problem is made
worse by the fact that each government prefers to
have its own scheme rather than using those intro-
duced by the preceding ones. The problem is par-
ticularly salient in the area of labour policy.
Specific targeted support for hiring a given cate-
gory of worker under given conditions, either in
the form of a special kind of labour contract or
some tax deductibility, abound and have a high
birth and death rate: according to the French min-
istry of labour, about 80 such measures were intro-
duced between 1974 and 1993, i.e., about 4 per
year. Of the two new flexible labour contracts
introduced by the Villepin government, one (the
CPE) was withdrawn after having been voted by
Parliament in the face of violent protest, the other
(the CNE) was quietly eliminated by the
Sarkozy/Fillon administration in the context of
the 2008 labour negotiations. With the current
administration, there are signs that the reversibil-
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19 This also raises the problem of evaluating the RGPP, since this
negative productivity effect may be considered as a shortcoming
(which is true if one considers the public sector in isolation) whereas
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ity syndrome is present once again. There have
been hints that some measures have been intro-
duced on an “experimental” basis, implying that
they could easily be cancelled. The taxi reform was
abandoned in the face of protests, as described in
Box 4.4. The RSA is being financed by a tax on
capital income, which amounts to a partial rever-
sal of the fiscal package.
If reforms are highly reversible, economic agents will
ignore them when setting their strategy but be happy
to cash-in whatever benefits are available. The end
result is that policy is ineffective, and can even have
perverse effects in some cases.20 For example, a firm
will not invest the resources to hire an additional
worker in response to some subsidy if it expects that
in the near future the subsidy will vanish and will be
replaced by some other scheme that does not apply to
that worker. But it will be happy to earn the subsidy
on any worker it would have hired absent the subsidy.
In other words the deadweight loss associated with a
given policy – the part of the cost of the policy which
has no impact on economic outcome – is greater, the
less credible the policy, i.e., the more short-lived it is
expected to be. The uncertainty created by the possi-
bility of reversal also impedes investment since a
rational investor has an incentive to “wait-and-see” if
the reforms will last. 
To conclude, the Sarkozy administration has done
more than previous administrations and has displayed
a general will to boost economic activity. But it has
done so in the same way as preceding governments:
small reversible steps that add to the complexity of a
costly and hard to control policy apparatus. This rais-
es doubts about the effectiveness of the reforms. 
Four paradigms
A key prerequisite for a successful transformation of
society is an overall reform plan with clearly stated
goals and measurable intermediate targets. This can
create synergy effects between reforms instead of
inconsistencies that reduce or nullify the overall
reform effect. Unlike the Thatcher and Reagan gov-
ernments or indeed Sarkozy’s socialist predecessors,
there is no central organising principle to guide the
reform other than the political will to act quickly and
to engage in thorough and massive action. This lack
of structure explains the apparent lack of consistency
of the reforms. They reflect various strands of the
public debate and ideological stances. This diversity
can be summarised by four distinct paradigms which
often conflict with one another:
Paradigm 1: Free markets
This category includes all the reforms that are in
accordance with the general prescription of eliminat-
ing barriers to entry in labour and product markets
and freeing competition. Economists believe that
deregulation and competition are good because they
favour mutually profitable transactions, which inher-
ently increase welfare. But this view is mostly absent
from the French public debate. Instead, freeing mar-
kets is most often motivated on grounds that are dubi-
ous to economists:
First, a common argument is that free markets are
conducive to economic growth and employment.
While few economists would disagree, this view is fun-
damentally flawed. There are policies that increase
growth and employment and have little to do with lib-
eralisation; quite often they are associated with a poor
allocation of resources and their positive aggregate
effects do not justify them. This will be the case of any
tax-funded increase in public investment that disre-
gards the true value of that investment to consumers.
Conversely, many deregulations benefit consumers
despite having few aggregate effects. Thus, recent
moves to liberalise shopping hours on Sunday have
been criticised on the grounds that they would create
few jobs, and that argument has played some role in
the government’s reluctance to go ahead with that.
Yet a simpler argument is that it makes perfect sense
to allow people to buy and sell whenever they want.
Indeed no one has contemplated commissioning a
study on the employment effects of the reverse reform
of restricting shopping hours.
Second, free markets have been motivated by the
politicians’ concern to redistribute in favour of their
own constituency. Right-wing governments have his-
torically engaged much more in labour market
reforms than product market ones. (In fact, rigidities
in product markets and the retail sector were rein-
forced by the 1996 law, under a right-wing adminis-
tration.) Conversely, left-wing governments have his-
torically been less averse to deregulating goods mar-
kets while they were making labour markets more
rigid. Relative to this historical record, the Sarkozy
administration seems keen on deregulating both
goods markets and labour markets, which is unusual
20 In particular, as pointed out by Bertola and Ichino (1995), shrink-
ing firms may use labour flexibility to reduce their workforce now,
while growing ones fail to increase hirings as they expect the reform
to be overturned.and commendable, despite the Taxi hiccup discussed
above.
Third, deregulation has often been used by right-wing
politicians to buttress their political capital. As it is
typically associated with conflict with special interest
groups, it provides them with an opportunity to “flex
their muscles” and signal their strength to their elec-
torate. Of course such a strategy may backfire if the
battle is lost, which has happened quite often. In that
respect, the Sarkozy/Fillon government has been
unusually successful. The level of protest has been
quite low given the number of reforms, perhaps
because labour unions have been exposed to such a
high number of reforms that designing a strategy has
proved problematic for them. 
Therefore, the “free market” paradigm in France is
quite fragile. In some sense, it could be even less influ-
ential, given the lack of support for the idea of free
markets in France. As documented in Table 4.5, based
on the world values survey, France is the only country
where a majority of people oppose free markets.
Historically, Gaullist administrations were quite
dirigistic, following de Gaulle’s view, reported in his
memoirs, that markets are valuable only to allocate
goods such as groceries. The Right gradually became
more favourable to the market economy in the 1970s,
and attempted its first wave of free-market reforms
during Chirac’s last term as prime minister in
1986–1988. This was associated with considerable
street protest and led to a socialist victory in 1988.
Since then, pro-market reforms have proceeded at a
cautious pace and politicians have typically justified
them as a constraint imposed by the European Union
– rhetoric that backlashed in 2005 when France reject-
ed the European constitutional treaty. 
This background explains why even when the govern-
ment wants to improve the efficiency of the economy,
it typically relies on taxes and subsidies or special pro-
grammes rather than a mere scrapping of existing reg-
ulations. 
Paradigm 2: France Inc.
There is a traditional tendency in French economic
policy to support French businesses in gaining mar-
ket shares even at the cost of taxpayers’ money
and/or reducing economic efficiency. This includes
state aid to “strategic” sectors, political involvement
to obtain contracts abroad, etc. The 2007 EEAG
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Table 4.5 

















Argentina 42 29 11 31 13 16 2 26
Brazil 57 30 18 40 19 11 4 9
Canada 65 29 22 43 19 10 2 3
China 74 20 25 49 16 4 3 4
France 36 50 10 26 27 29 3 11
Germany 65 32 29 36 24 9 2 1
Great
Britain 66 27 26 39 17 10 2 5
India 70 17 34 35 12 6 3 11
Indonesia 68 29 22 46 25 4 1 3
Italy 59 31 21 38 20 12 4 5
Kenya 59 28 33 25 12 13 3 13
Mexico 61 38 21 40 27 11 0 1
Nigeria 66 29 34 31 13 16 2 4
Philippines 73 22 23 50 17 5 2 4
Poland 63 19 22 41 14 5 4 14
Russia 43 34 11 32 25 9 7 15
S. Korea 70 19 11 60 17 2 5 6
Spain 63 28 27 36 14 14 1 8
Turkey 47 36 54 2 3 16 4 12
USA 71 24 34 37 15 9 2 3
A v e r a g e 6 12 82 23 91 910 3 8
Source: http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/jan06/FreeMarkets_Jan06_quaire.pdfEEAG Report 2009 161
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report includes a chapter on economic nationalism
that discusses these issues. The Sarkozy administra-
tion has not abandoned that approach; if anything it
has reinforced it. For example, the loi de modernisa-
tion de l’economie grants preferential access for
“innovating”small businesses to public procurement,
up to 15 percent of the total amounts. It is not clear
how one defines an “innovative” small business and
such a measure will clearly open the door to
favouritism and political quid pro quos in local pub-
lic commitments. While foreign firms are not dis-
criminated against by this measure – otherwise one
would violate the rules of the European Union –
restricting it to small businesses clearly gives an edge
to French firms, as small firms typically lack the
skills and expertise to extend their operations abroad.
Finally, granting preferential access to public pro-
curement is a very inefficient way to stimulate inno-
vation. Instead, one should promote intellectual
property rights and public investment in fundamental
research. The measure sounds very much like the out-
come of lobbying and is likely to reduce the efficien-
cy of public investment as well as the degree of com-
petition in French goods markets. It is therefore in
contradiction with other measures of the same loi de
modernization de l’économie which promote competi-
tion in other areas. 
Recent developments, in particular associated with
the financial crisis, suggest that economic nationalism
is gathering momentum in France. Hence in late
October 2008, the president announced a grand fonds
stratégique d’investissement national (great strategic
fund for national investment). The extent to which a
country with soaring public debt and a trade deficit
can run a sovereign fund on any significant basis is
unclear. But it is likely that this fund will be managed
so as to defend “strategic national interests”, i.e., will
favour national firms over foreign ones, for example,
by taking on participations in national champions to
block foreign takeovers. This will distort the alloca-
tion of resources in the ways we have analysed in our
2007 chapter. As an example, in early November 2007,
the government partially nationalised a major ship-
building firm, the Chantiers de l’Atlantique, by taking
a 33 percent stake. 
Paradigm 3: Reliance on social partners
Since 1950, the so-called “social partners” have
played an increasing role in the design of policies.
The agreements they sign apply to all the workers in
the relevant economic sectors even if they are not
affiliated with the unions that have signed these
agreements. The legitimacy of this system of social
partnership is based on the 1950 law which names
five “representative”labour unions whose agreements
are binding.21 Thus these unions are representative de
jure regardless of their actual membership, while
other unions are non-representative de jure. Further-
more, for an agreement to be applicable to the whole
sector, only one “representative”union and one “rep-
resentative”employer association need to have signed
the agreement.
There are two issues regarding this paradigm. One is
that being called representative in a 1950 law and
being currently representative are two different things.
In effect, the inclusion of new unions is prohibited.
This is the subject of much debate and is in the
process of being reformed.
Another is that there is a broad agreement in the
media, the public and policy circles that collective
bargaining is a legitimate source of law. Yet, as econ-
omists, we know that collective bargaining (even if it
were much more representative than in the French
system) is not a democratic institution as it excludes
the non-employed: students, retirees, the unem-
ployed and so forth. This exclusion leads to ineffi-
ciencies in the agreements being reached, such as
excess protection of the insiders at the expense of the
outsiders and consequently a high level of unem-
ployment. 
The Sarkozy administration has not challenged such
legitimacy except insofar as it is implementing a
reform of the concept of representativeness, which
was long overdue anyway. One illustration is the del-
egation to “social partners” of the reform of the
labour contract discussed in the preceding section,
instead of handing it to Parliament. As a result, the
reform that comes out of this process suffers from
two drawbacks:
– It is limited in scope because of the inevitable bias
toward quid pro quo and consensus. Instead, a
parliamentary majority does not have to make
concessions to the minority to implement its
reforms.
– It ignores the interests of the outsiders of the
labour market (the non-employed), as well as those
who are not represented by the organisations that
signed the agreement.
21 These unions are: CGT, CFDT, FO, CGC and CFTC.Thus, the reform has merely exploited the margins of
improvement that were not a matter of controversy
between the social partners. One may expect that if
the parliamentary majority had designed the reform
instead, job creation and the competitiveness of firms
would have played a bigger role and the welfare of
incumbent employees a smaller one.
Another drawback of relying on negotiation is that it
is not immune to renegotiation. Unions have a strate-
gic interest to renegotiate because (by virtue of the
“social progress” paradigm, which is discussed next)
the concessions they get are far more irreversible than
the concessions they make. It is much harder to abol-
ish some benefit once it is considered as an “acquis”
than to alter things like a provision for greater con-
tractual freedom or for stronger monitoring of the
unemployed. And there are precedents. The “PARE”
agreement between social partners was implemented
under the Jospin government and involved tighter
monitoring of the unemployed’s search activity in
exchange for more generous unemployment benefits.
The latter stayed but the former was quickly emptied
of any real content. The contrat nouvelle embauche
(CNE) was introduced by the Villepin government to
allow firms to hire the long-term unemployed under a
more flexible form of CDI. It had been widely used
but was abolished by a stroke of pen in 2008 as part
of the concession package to the unions in exchange
for the January 11 agreement. While the CNE was not
the outcome of collective bargaining (it had been
designed by the office of the prime minister), its abo-
lition came after much pressure by the unions and
shows how labour market reforms can easily be can-
celled. It would not be surprising if the new CMD had
a similar fate. 
Paradigm 4: Social progress
The paradigm that there should be social progress,
meaning that there should be ever more redistribution
and more social insurance, is highly influential in
France. Historically, redistributive schemes have
almost never been dismantled. Every form of “social
progress” is therefore irreversible. For example, one
can list a number of redistributive policies that have
been implemented by the Left and that the Right con-
siders as untouchable:
– The RMI assistance income for any individual
above 25 years of age, established in 1988
– The CMU granting complete health coverage for
people below a certain threshold, introduced in the
late 1990s by the Jospin government
– The obligation for any municipality to have at least
20 percent of publicly subsidised “social housing”,
despite the inefficiencies and unfairness of this
type of redistribution
– The wealth tax (ISF), which has been regularly
proved to cost more money in the form of lost VAT
receipts than it brings in tax revenues, because of
the exodus of the very wealthy who escape its
absurdly high marginal tax rates.
To date, this paradigm has not been challenged by the
Sarkozy administration and has led to compromises
and contradictions. 
In the area of labour regulation, the paradigm has
ruled out any overall reduction in the level of worker
protection à la “Anglo-Saxon” model. Instead, the
popular model is the Danish model of “flexicurity”,
which trades a reduction in employment protection
for an increase in the generosity of unemployment
benefits, associated with tighter monitoring of the
unemployed’s search activity.22
In the area of income support, the constraints
imposed by the paradigm have led to the revenu de sol-
idarité active (RSA) reform discussed above. Any
reduction in the level of support at any income level
has been ruled out, so that the smoothing of the mar-
ginal tax rates needed to eliminate the inactivity trap
has been associated with an increase in the amounts
that will be redistributed. This is clearly costly to the
taxpayer and the reform has been hastily financed by
a new tax on capital income, which is in direct contra-
diction with the fiscal package and has sent a very
confusing signal to the public about the goals of the
government. Also, reducing the minimum wage in
exchange for the introduction of the RSA was not
considered, despite our argument that it would have
greatly enhanced its effect on job creation. 
4. Conclusion
The current administration has claimed to have bro-
ken with past policy practices. This claim is validated
by the sheer quantity of reforms that have been intro-
duced in less than two years. Yet closer scrutiny
reveals little novelty in the nature of these reforms.
They remain incremental, complex and reversible as
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(2007), with some critical conclusions. In particular, the PARE
episode mentioned above suggests that flexicurity may be problem-
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their predecessors, and exhibit contradictions because
of the conflicting paradigms that motivate them. In
that respect, the current administration has if any-
thing aggravated the problem because it has vastly
increased the number of policy reforms. Thus we are
concerned that the overall effect on the economy will
be quite small.
On the other hand, the approach seems to have gener-
ated political benefits by increasing the scope for
action of a democratically elected government which
faces entrenched special interests. Perhaps the com-
plexity and number of reforms has helped, for exam-
ple, by making it difficult for opponents to co-ordi-
nate their agenda on a given item.23 A natural course
of action for the next three years would be to build on
this political capital to elect a small number of far-
reaching reforms and focus on them. 
The most promising one is the RGPP because it may
yield the largest long-term benefits. Furthermore, it
has the merit of being quite sheltered from political
opposition, because it lacks obvious distributive con-
sequences. As we have argued, it is difficult to evalu-
ate. But we believe random policy measures do not
help it, both because they divert human resources that
could be better used in the RGPP and because they
interfere with it, for example by artificially boosting
the need for administrative units that could otherwise
be dismantled or shrunk. 
Another untouched issue is the minimum wage, which
is increasingly a burden. In this respect the govern-
ment has lost a golden opportunity to bundle the
RSA reform with a reduction in the minimum wage.
This would have been politically difficult but worth
the benefits: while the RSA itself would have been far
more effective, the reform would have broken the
taboo that redistribution can never go too far and
helped to remove the low-skilled trap that we dis-
cussed above. 
List of abbreviations:
CDD contrat à durée déterminée determined duration contract
CDI contrat à durée indéterminée undetermined duration contract
CMD contrat à durée déterminée determined mission contract
CMU couverture maladie universelle universal health care coverage
CNE contrat nouvelle ebauche flexible labour contract
CPE contrat première embauche flexible labour contract
CTP contrat de transition professionelle
supplementary unemployment benefits
for some workers
ISF impôt de solidarité sur la fortune wealth tax
RGPP révision générale des politiques publiques general revision of public policy
RMI revenue minimum d'insertion basic assistance income
RSA revenue de solidarité active earned income tax credit
23 This may explain why Sarkozy was successful with his reform of
régimes spéciaux while Juppé was not.References
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